The geopolitics of critical minerals has moved from a niche concern in energy policy circles to a front-line risk for every organization with exposure to advanced manufacturing, clean energy, defense technology, or digital infrastructure. The concentration dynamics at play are, in our assessment, the most underappreciated strategic risk in corporate planning today.
The Concentration Problem
The numbers are stark. China controls approximately 60% of global rare earth mining and 90% of processing capacity. The Democratic Republic of Congo produces 70% of the world's cobalt. Three countries account for 75% of lithium extraction. These concentration levels exceed those that triggered the oil shocks of the 1970s — and unlike oil, there are no strategic petroleum reserve equivalents for most critical minerals.
What makes this concentration strategically significant is its intersection with geopolitical competition. Critical minerals are not merely commodities — they are instruments of statecraft. Export restrictions on gallium, germanium, and graphite in recent years were not trade measures; they were demonstrations of leverage capacity. Boards that view these events as isolated incidents are misreading the strategic environment.
Mapping the Exposure
Our geopolitical risk desk has mapped critical mineral dependencies across seven sectors, tracing the chain from extraction through processing to end-use. The findings should concern any board with significant technology or manufacturing exposure. Electric vehicle manufacturers face concentrated risk across lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth magnets. Semiconductor fabrication depends on neon, palladium, and several rare earths. Even sectors that consider themselves "asset-light" — such as financial services and professional services — carry indirect exposure through their technology infrastructure and real estate portfolios.
The processing bottleneck is arguably more consequential than the mining concentration. Even where extraction is geographically distributed, processing overwhelmingly flows through a single jurisdiction. Diversifying mining sources without diversifying processing capacity simply extends the supply chain without reducing the chokepoint risk.
Scenarios for H2 2026
We model three scenarios for the second half of 2026. In the base case, selective export controls continue to expand incrementally, creating price volatility and extended lead times without full supply disruption. In the escalation scenario — which we assign a 25-30% probability — a geopolitical flashpoint triggers broad-based mineral export restrictions, producing acute shortages in specific supply chains within 60-90 days. In the cooperation scenario, multilateral agreements on mineral trade stabilize access, though this remains the least likely outcome given current diplomatic trajectories.
The strategic implication for boards is clear: critical mineral risk is not a hypothetical — it is a live exposure that requires active management. Organizations should be mapping their full mineral dependency chains, stress-testing procurement strategies against supply disruption scenarios, and engaging in the strategic stockpiling and alternative sourcing discussions that reduce vulnerability to leverage events.
Board-Level Recommendations
Risk committees should commission a critical mineral dependency assessment that extends beyond direct procurement to include embedded dependencies in products, infrastructure, and technology platforms. This assessment should feed into scenario planning that tests business continuity under restricted-access conditions. And boards should advocate for — and fund — R&D into material substitution and recycling technologies that reduce long-term concentration risk.
Key Takeaway
Critical mineral concentration represents a systemic risk that intersects geopolitics, technology strategy, and supply chain resilience. Boards that fail to map and manage this exposure are leaving their organizations vulnerable to leverage events that could disrupt operations with limited warning.
